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Abstract—Due to the importance of reliable electricity supply
and the evolutions in the electrical grid, it can be expected that
the way in which we assess reliability need to be adapted. At
this moment, reliability is commonly assessed deterministically
based on an N-1 criterion, while risk-based reliability assessment
is widely available in academic works and is used in other
industries. However, because of the years of successful use as
well as the straightforward and transparent character of the
currently used deterministic approach based on an N-1 criterion,
stakeholders of the power system are not eager to apply other
approaches. Nevertheless, probabilistic assessment is better suited
to take into account growing uncertainty and complexity, for
instance due to the increased amount of renewable energy sources.
Such approaches are well-known for a long time, but difficulties
in computation, limitations on the availability of stochastic input
data and difficulties in correctly weighing the benefits of using
these approaches have prevented them from being used in
practice. This paper indicates the need for a comparison between
these probabilistic reliability assessments and the deterministic
assessment that is currently used. Difficulties in comparing
various approaches are shown illustratively through the reliability
assessment of a basic test system. The focus of this example is
on planning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability of electricity supply plays a major role in the
economics and social well-being of a modern society and
directly influences the quality of life. A one day blackout could
lead to costs that are about 0.5% of the GDP of a country,
which have to be added with possible social consequences such
as diseases, deaths and injuries [1]. The effect on consumers,
especially industry, can be such that the reliability of the local
energy provision is key to the selection of a site, e.g. Google
that is located in Bergen (Belgium). Therefore, the power
system can be seen as one of the most critical infrastructures
these days and a correct assessment and adequate level of the
reliability is of utmost importance.
The power system is also one of the most complex man-
made systems in the world, which is continuously evolving.
Some evolutions of the last decades are the increasing degree
of interconnection, deregulation, privatization and unbundling.
On the other hand, currently used reliability models were
conceived with a centrally planned and operated nature of
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generation, transmission and distribution in mind [2]. Restruc-
turing to enable European wide competition has led to increas-
ing awareness of cost effectiveness and changing concerns of
different stakeholders. Utilities also accept higher risks due to
competition [3]. Moreover, increasing generation of renewable
energy sources in the system has led to higher uncertainties,
which under N-1 criteria, or an adapted formulation of the
N-1 criteria, require larger reliability margins and hence lead
to a system that is used in a less cost-effective manner. The
increasing use of power electronics challenges the reliability
of the system and the application of the currently used re-
liability criteria even more. Furthermore, reports show that
major disturbances occur due to combinations of failures not
dealt with in the currently used deterministic approach based
on an N-1 criterion, as it deems them as not probable [4]–
[6]. Consequently, the implementation of new probabilistic
reliability criteria needs to be considered [7].
McCalley and his associates demonstrate the shortcom-
ings of an N-1 criterion by comparing with a risk based
approach using a predefined contingency list [8]. Kirschen et
al. further elaborate on this by using Monte Carlo simulation
techniques considering all contingencies [9]. Outweighing both
approaches is difficult because accuracy and computational
burden need to be balanced. Benefits of using one approach
compared to the other are not quantified yet. On the other
hand, Guler et al. propose an approach for the assessment of
market performance under a specified reliability criterion and
its reliability management framework. This entails a quantifi-
cation of the monetary impact of applying an N-1 criterion
under various reliability management frameworks using a
security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF), however,
without taking into account probabilities [10]. It is important
to mention that in all methodologies, data availability and
accuracy is of utmost importance. Specifically the availability
of stochastic input data limits the use of probabilistic methods.
This paper elaborates on the importance of comparing
reliability criteria and the assessment of reliability focussing on
arising difficulties in comparing the impact of applying various
reliability criteria. Firstly, section II clarifies various terms used
in this paper concerning reliability. Section III deals with the
importance of comparing reliability criteria by firstly introduc-
ing the currently known criteria and approaches complemented
with their shortcomings. In section IV, different reliability
criteria and the assessment of reliability are compared using a
small test system and arising difficulties are presented. Finally,
section V concludes the paper.
II. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
Power system reliability means the probability that an
electric power system can perform a required function under
given conditions for a given time interval [11]. Thus reliability
quantifies the ability of a power system to provide an adequate
supply of electrical energy in order to satisfy the customer
requirements with few interruptions over an extended period
of time. It can be divided into power system security and power
system adequacy [12].
The aim of a high power system reliability is a low
frequency of inability to serve load with the required quality
and a very low frequency of experiencing spectacular system
failures such as blackouts [13]. To ensure an adequate level
of reliability while minimizing socio-economic costs, power
system reliability management is applied, which is composed
of two main tasks: i) reliability assessment and ii) reliability
control.
Reliability assessment aims at identifying the actual relia-
bility level. An acceptable reliability level is set by a reliability
criterion, which can be expressed as a set of constraints
that must be satisfied. Criteria mainly used these days are
derived from the deterministic N-1 approach, which states
that the system should be able to withstand at all times the
loss of any one of its main elements (lines, transformers,
generators, etc.) without significant degradation of service
quality. Similarly, generation adequacy can for instance be
ensured by generation reserves that must be equivalent to
the capacity of the largest unit on the system plus a fixed
percentage of the dispatched capacity [14]. New reliability
criteria based on other (probabilistic) reliability indicators
might improve reliability. The suitability of various reliability
indicators depends on the hierarchical level they are applied to,
i.e. generation, generation and transmission or the combination
of generation, transmission and distribution. Typical reliability
indicators used in power system adequacy evaluation are en-
ergy not served, frequency and duration indicators, loss of load
probability,. . . They indicate the probability, severity, frequency
and duration of loss of load [14]. These reliability indicators
can either be system indicators or load point indicators, which
represent the reliability of respectively the whole system or
individual load points. This paper focuses on generation and
transmission and calculates reliability indicators at busbars
at which large customers and distribution system operators
(DSOs) are connected.
Reliability assessment methods allow to verify whether
reliability criteria are satisfied and to quantify the reliability
level of the system using reliability indicators. Two main
reliability assessment methods for a probabilistic reliability
assessment are the analytical contingency enumeration method
and the simulation method (e.g. Monte Carlo) [7]. System
security can be evaluated using a probabilistic security assess-
ment, transient stability assessment, dynamic security assess-
ment,. . . The deterministic approach currently used in practice
applies state enumeration and checks for a predefined set
of N-1 contingencies whether limits on system variables are
violated.
Reliability control entails taking preventive and corrective
actions in order to satisfy the applied reliability criterion [15]
and avoid unacceptable deficits of electricity supply. Preventive
actions are pre-contingency modifications to the power system
that are taken to satisfy the reliability requirements and to
prevent a transition to an emergency state. Corrective actions
are post contingency actions and taken when the system is
in an alert or emergency state, to correct the system behavior
in order to recover to the normal state. Possible actions are
generation redispatch, adjustment of reactive control variables
or load shedding [16]. An emergency state sometimes requires
an emergency plan to recover the system. An overview of the
different system states and respective kinds of control actions is
shown in figure 1. Next to short term control actions, decisions
on system development and asset management are important
to control the reliability level of the system [17].
Fig. 1. Overview of reliability control by using preventive, corrective or
restorative control depending on the state of the system [10]
III. IMPORTANCE OF COMPARING RELIABILITY CRITERIA
AND THE ASSESSMENT OF RELIABILITY
Based on the state of the art of the development as well as
experiences of the application of various types of reliability
assessment and criteria, the need for comparing reliability
criteria can be derived.
A. Types of reliability criteria
In order to obtain sufficient reliability in the power system,
redundancy in the grid will be needed, but a clear risk for
over-investments or restriction of the market exists. Reliability
criteria should guarantee an appropriate reliability level of the
power system, which balances these economic and reliability
considerations.
The first reliability assessments used in practical applica-
tions and still used nowadays all have a common deterministic
nature, but the effective criteria differ for different time hori-
zons of power system exploitation, namely system develop-
ment (long term), operational planning and asset management
(medium term) and operation (short term) [18], which are
interlinked. The focus of this work is on planning. Network
capacity planning is mainly based on an N-1 criterion. This
is satisfied by constructing a minimal number of circuits to a
load group. The minimal number of circuits depends on the
maximal demand of the group [18]. N-1 criteria, however, have
various shortcomings [1], [7], [9], [13], [19], [20]:
• It is important to note that although an N-1 criterion
is straightforward, transparent and widely used, it in
itself can be interpreted in many ways. In practice,
neither the number of elements to be considered (N)
nor the type of contingencies considered (-1) is dealt
with equally amongst TSOs and even within a single
organization.
• They suppose that different contingencies are equally
severe and that they occur equally likely.
• They do not give an incentive based on economic
principles, because they do not take outage costs into
account.
• All grid elements are assumed equally important and
all generators and consumers have equal weight.
• They do not consider the stochastic nature of fail-
ures of grid components, generation and demand,
the interdependencies between different events or the
interaction between the frequency of the contingencies
and the exposure time to high stress conditions.
• They are binary criteria: the system is either reliable
or not reliable. Therefore, an accurate reliability level
cannot be obtained, which results in over or under-
investments.
• They only take into account single contingencies. Sin-
gle contingencies are much more probable than double
contingencies if outages are independent events, but
hidden failures in the protection system can trigger
additional outages cascaded to the original fault. Fur-
thermore, due to significant increase of the rate of
outages during bad weather conditions, the probability
of two quasi simultaneous but independent outages is
no longer negligible.
Nevertheless, N-1 criteria, or adapted formulations of the
N-1 criterion, are extensively used nowadays due to various
reasons. Firstly, they could be used at any time, because
the predictability and controllability by the grid operator
of the operating environment of the electric power system
was sufficiently high until recently. Secondly, interconnections
initially aimed at mutualizing some risks in terms of short
term adequacy, while keeping cross border flows limited. N-1
criteria could be easily satisfied due to the conservative design
of the interconnections at the initial stage, but this could lead to
non-optimal solutions. This is in contrast with the current use,
because cross-border power flows increase significantly due to
the development of the European Electricity market, which
requires more coordination over a wider area. Thirdly, the
deterministic N-1 approach is easy to understand, transparent
and straightforward to implement in contrast to the complexity
of implementing probabilistic approaches [21].
However, many probabilistic aspects are inherent to the
power system due to internal and external events. Firstly,
demand is fluctuating over time, so uncertainties exist in the
forecasts. Next to that, renewable energy sources, such as
solar energy and wind energy strongly depend on the weather
conditions, so generation schedules are influenced by weather
forecasts as well as by market behavior, which is also uncertain
and influenced by renewable energy sources as well. Events
occur randomly, uncontrolled vegetation can lead to sudden
short circuits with overhead lines, power system components
can fail in an unpredictable manner,. . . Furthermore, the system
is used closer to its limits and more complex solutions are used
due to the low social acceptance of overhead lines [7].
A lot of research is already done on development and
application of new approaches incorporating these probabilistic
effects in reliability analysis [22]. Probabilistic approaches are
already used in reliability calculations for power system plan-
ning and development, for instance to determine the generation
reserve in the system development phase, but transmission
system operators (TSOs) apply them rarely in the operational
time frame [9]. Some countries that use probabilistic reliability
criteria for planning are Australia [7], New Zealand [7] and
the province of British Columbia in Canada [20]. The limited
use of probabilistic approaches is among others due to the
transparency, straightforward characteristics, lower computa-
tional burden and the acceptable level of reliability that results
from deterministic criteria but on the other hand, this results
also from data limitations and the lack of quantified benefits
of using probabilistic approaches.
B. Reasons for comparison
Probabilistic approaches have the ability to overcome many
of the shortcomings related to a deterministic N-1 approach
and to tackle issues that come with evolutions of the power
system. Also literature points out the importance of the evo-
lution towards probabilistic approaches [7], [17], [19].
In order to convince stakeholders to implement new re-
liability criteria, a thorough evaluation and comparison of
these new reliability criteria with currently used N-1 criteria is
needed. This comparison needs to take into account reliability
aspects as well as economic aspects. It allows to quantify
benefits of implementing other reliability criteria that simplify
making economically justified investments in the power system
or taking appropriate operational action, which will improve
reliability and social welfare1 in the next decades.
Furthermore, the comparison of probabilistic indicators
with the currently used N-1 criterion allows the determination
of appropriate thresholds of the probabilistic indicators. These
can be used as reliability criteria that can take reliability as
well as economic aspects into account, which will contribute
to a cost effective increase of reliability.
IV. COMPARING RELIABILITY CRITERIA AND THE
ASSESSMENT OF RELIABILITY
Comparing the performance of various reliability criteria
is a difficult task. A set of difficulties is demonstrated using a
reliability test system on which the impact of system develop-
ment decisions could be assessed.
A. Methodology
The reliability of the basic test system shown in figure 2,
which is based on the Roy Billinton Reliability test system
[23], is assessed using Matlab and the MATPOWER tool
[24]. In order to investigate the influence of adaptations to
the system on reliability indicators, four different cases are
considered as given in figure 2.
Failure times of the branches are assumed to be exponen-
tially distributed [18], so failure rates (λ) are constant and are
1In this paper, social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer and






Fig. 2. Used reliability test system [23]. Four cases are considered. Case 1
is the system without the dashed elements, i.e. the base case, case 2 is case 1
with 30MW extra non-variable generation installed at node 2, case 3 is case
2 with an extra line between node 2 and 4 and case 4 is case 2 with 42MW
non-variable generation installed at node 4.
summarized in table I [23]. Based on these failure rates and a
constant repair time of 10 hours, the probability of failure of
the various branches can be calculated. Slimit corresponds to
the thermal limit of the lines.
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT DATA OF THE TEST SYSTEM [23]
Branches λ [year−1] Probability of failure Slimit [MVA]
1-2 4 0.004568 71
1-3 1.5 0.001713 85
2-4 5 0.005710 71
3-4 1 0.001142 71
3-5 1 0.001142 71
4-5 1 0.001142 71
Nodes E[Pg,2] (σ) [MW] Maximum load [MW]
Case 1 Case 2,3,4
1 80 (+/-0) 80 (+/-0) 0
2 90 (+/-5) 130 (+/-5) 21.3
3 0 0 90.5
4 0 0 42.6
5 0 0 10.6
The reliability of the test system is assessed as a function
of two system variables, namely total load (Pd) and generation
capacity at node 2 (Pg,2). Generation capacity at the first
node is fixed, while generation capacity at the second node is
normally distributed with average value (E[Pg,2]) and standard
deviation (σ) depending on the considered case, as indicated
in table I. The annual load distribution is calculated based on
values in [23]. Generation capacity and load are considered as
independent variables and form a domain X , {x = [x1 x2] :
x1 ∈ [Pd,min..Pd,max], x2 ∈ [Pg,2,min..Pg,2,max]} with x a
particular combination of values of the system variables, i.e.
x1 corresponds to Pd and x2 to Pg,2. Pd,min, Pd,max, Pg,2,min
and Pg,2,max are the limits of the domain consisting of load
and generation capacity at node 2.
The probabilistic reliability assessment applied in this
paper uses the analytical method of contingency enumeration.
The contingency list contains contingencies up to two branch
outages. The reliability is assessed for all contingency cases on
the contingency list, for every x, i.e. a particular combination of
values of the system variables. Violations of branch flow limits
and voltage limits are relieved using corrective actions, namely
generation redispatch and load shedding. Three probabilistic
reliability indicators, i.e. the interruption duration, the energy
not served and the outage costs, quantify the reliability level
of the system if a certain reliability criterion with its respective
reliability management is applied.
Interruption duration is based on the restoration time of
load shed, which consists of two parts: control time and




[min], with PS the load shed and PTot
the total load that would need to be supplied. The restoration
rate after this control period depends on the duration of the
interruption for which four time intervals are defined in [25].
Annualized expected interruption duration for one combination





Fi is the number of appearances of contingency case i per year,
IDi(PS,i(x)) is the interruption duration based on the heuristic
for restoration times in [25] with PS,i(x) the load shed, both
for contingency case i.
Annualized expected energy not served for a particular
combination of values of the system variables ENS(x) can




PS,i(x)× IDi(PS,i(x))× Fi (2)
Finally, annualized expected outage costs can be calculated
using value of lost load (VOLL), which are costs in [e/kWh]
caused by the interruption of energy. VOLL for a typical bus as
given by Kirschen et al. [25] is used for all nodes. These values
are converted to e using a conversion factor of 1.22e/£. VOLL
is in principal a non linear function of duration, location and
time and subject to debate. In the same way as the interruption
duration, annualized expected outage costs for a particular






with OCi(x) the outage cost for contingency case i calculated
using
∑n
j=1(VOLL(tj)× tj × PS,i,j(x)). In this equation, tj
is the outage time for load segment j computed from the
load restoration process, PS,i,j(x) is the reconnected load
corresponding to segment j and VOLL(tj) is the value of lost
load as stated in [25] as a function of the outage time.
By complementing these annualized indicator values with
probabilities of occurrence of various combinations of values
of the system variables, expected annual values of the reliabil-











with RI(x) the annualized expected value of the reliability
indicator (e.g. ID(x), ENS(x), OC(x)), p(x) the probability
of operating in state x, a particular combination of values of
the system variables, and ∆x1 and ∆x2 the discrete intervals
between the considered values of the system variables.
B. Discussion of the results
Figure 3 shows the operational region of case 1 in terms
of total load and generation capacity at node 2, complemented
with the operational limits of the N-0 and N-1 criteria and an
iso-risk curve in terms of ENS. The figure shows that operating
corresponding to the N-0 or N-1 criterion does not imply a
constant risk level. The N-0 limit exists due to the possibility of
lack of generation capacity in combination with higher loads.
Although probabilities for N-0 unsafe conditions are smaller
than 0.0011, action is needed in order to satisfy the criterion.
Investments in non-variable generation at node 2 could solve
this issue (case 2). Furthermore, part of the operational region
lies within the unsafe N-1 region.
Fig. 3. Operational region of case 1 in terms of total load and generation
capacity at node 2. Probabilities of the operational points are given by
the contour plot. Values corresponding to the outer contour and maximum
probability are indicated. The dashed and dotted lines represent respectively
the N-0 and N-1 operational limits, while the bold full line shows an iso-risk
curve in terms of ENS.
Satisfying different reliability criteria requires actions, but
the N-1 reliability criterion does not indicate which action
is preferable. It only indicates which ones are acceptable
and those that are not. Table II shows the influence on the
probabilistic reliability indicators of different reinforcement
decisions to make case 2 N-1 safe. Values of the reliability
indicators in case 3 and 4 are expressed as a percentage of
the values in case 2. Based on various probabilistic reliability
indicators, different solutions could be put forward. An extra
line (case 3) outperforms in terms of expected interruption
duration, while you would opt for extra generation at node 4
(case 4) based on expected energy not served and outage costs.
If no unambiguous metric is defined, it is hard to compare the
impact of the application of various reliability criteria.
Cost effectiveness of reinforcements strongly depends on
the used contingency list. Figure 4 shows differences in
dynamic pay back period (DPBP)2 of an investment in an extra
2The dynamic pay back period (DPBP) takes into account the discount rate
and is defined as the year in which the net present value becomes positive.
TABLE II. RELATIVE RELIABILITY INDICATORS TO EVALUATE
POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT SCHEMES OF CASE 2
Indicators Case 2 1 Case 3 1 Case 4 1
Expected interruption duration (EID) [%] 100 3.14 5.05
Expected energy not served (EENS) [%] 100 2.24 1.73
Expected outage costs (EOC) [%] 100 3.10 2.99
1 Description of cases given in figure 2
line 2-4 using either a contingency list consisting of all single
branch outages or one taking into account up to two branch
outages. The assumed investment cost equals e1000000 /km.
Figure 4 shows that the investment looks much less interesting
in terms of dynamic pay back period if only single branch
outages are considered, while DPBP decreases a lot if two
simultaneous branch outages are considered as well.















Fig. 4. Dynamic pay back period of an investment in an extra line 2-4 using
two different contingency lists taking into account either single branch outages
(N-1) or up to two simultaneous branch outages (N-2) as a function of the
length of the line
C. Difficulties in comparing reliability criteria and the assess-
ment of reliability
Based on the reliability assessment of previous section and
from literature [8], [9], we observe that various difficulties
are encountered while comparing reliability criteria. Firstly,
various reliability criteria are based on different reliability
assessment approaches, each with their own fundamental math-
ematical methodologies. The probabilistic reliability indicators
in this paper are calculated using an analytical contingency
enumeration method. In theory, all possible contingencies,
including all combination of single contingencies, need to
be in the contingency list. This will lead to a very high
computational burden, especially in large complex systems.
Furthermore, because probabilistic approaches need extra input
data compared to deterministic ones, more variations are
possible in terms of assumptions and simplifications. These
input data can be based on forecasts or historical statistics
and are therefore less accurate. Moreover, the analysis in this
paper only considers the variation of two system variables,
while in practice the system consist of many more system
variables and control variables. These variables are not nec-
essarily independent and correlation with weather data needs
to be taken into account. The reliability level resulting from
probabilistic approaches will therefore strongly depend on the
assumptions and simplifications made and the used assessment
method. This balance between accuracy and computational
burden and the strong influence of assumptions on the results
hamper the comparison of the impact of the application of
various reliability criteria.
Deterministic approaches based on an N-1 criterion on
the other hand have a very straightforward contingency list,
namely the outage of one of all components at a time, and do
not take into account probabilities, which diminishes variation
in results. These criteria indicate whether action is needed, but
based on various reliability indicators, different best options
exist. Furthermore, nowadays no practical meaning is assigned
to numerical values of the probabilistic indicators.
Further research has to focus on the development of an
appropriate methodology to compare the performance of vari-
ous reliability criteria and its respective reliability management
using an unambiguous metric. Social welfare seems to be
the most appropriate proposal for this. This would imply
a regulatory framework that enables or gives incentives to
all stakeholders to operate their system in a manner that
maximizes social welfare. However, not all needed data for
social welfare evaluation are available to the relevant stake-
holders, specifically the system operator. Therefore, a suitable
approximation for social welfare needs to be developed, which
entails costs of energy not served for the customers as well as
costs resulting from reliability decisions in the framework of
reliability management incurred by TSOs. Including various
uncertainties of the system in this methodology will be a
challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
Deterministic reliability assessment is used successfully
for many years. However, due to evolutions in the power
system and various shortcomings of deterministic criteria (most
specifically N-1), other reliability assessment approaches need
to be considered. Other approaches are already developed, but
they are rarely used in practice and their benefits are not well
quantified. Nevertheless, they are important as decisions are
based on them. Therefore, comparing reliability criteria and
the assessment of reliability is important. This is a difficult
task due to the different mathematical nature of various kinds
of reliability assessments. Furthermore, deterministic assess-
ments based on an N-0 or N-1 criterion indicate appropriate
actions, but not the best option, while outcomes of proba-
bilistic assessments strongly depend on the assumptions made
and the balance between accuracy and computational burden.
Furthermore, lack of an appropriate metric to indicate the
benefits of applying one reliability criterion rather than another
hampers the comparison. This paper has illustrated the above
for transmission system planning in a system based on the
Roy Billinton Reliability test system. It shows that different
reliability indicators and criteria can lead to different decisions
in systems under uncertainty.
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